Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Stock Market by Martin Feldstein
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INFLATION, TAX RULES, AND THE
STOCK MARKET
Martin Feldstein
Working Paper No. 403
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02138
November 1979NBER Working Paper 403
November 1979
Inflation, Tax Rules and the Stock Market
ABSTRACT
This paper shows how the interaction of tax rules and
expected inflation can decrease substantially the share price
per dollar of pretax earnings. The current analysis extends my
earlier study (NBER Working PaperNo. 276) by recognizing
corporate debt, retained earnings, and the role of diverse share-
holder investments. As before, the analysis separates household
and institutional investors.
Martin Feldstein
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
617/868-3905Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Stock Market
Martin Feldstein*
The substantial fall in the real level of share prices during .
the past decade has raised the cost of capital to firms and
reduced their incentive to invest in new plant and equipment. l
In a previous paper (Feldstein, 1978a), I explained how existing
tax rules make the share prices of nonfinancial corporations
sensitive to changes in the expected rate of inflation. An
increase in the expected rate of inflation lowers the level of
share prices immediately while continued inflation at any expected
rate causes share prices to rise continually to maintain their
real value.
A significant feature of that paper was the explicit recog-
nition of two classes of portfolio investors: "households" that
pay an income tax on dividends and interest and a capital gains
*Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic
Research. This paper is part of the NBER Study of Capital Forma-
tion and will be presented at the Rochester University Research
Conference on October 25 and 26, 1979. I am grateful for discus-
sions with ~lan Auerbach,. David Bradford, Jerry Green, Mervyn
King, Lawrence Summers and other participants in the NBER summer
institutes on Business Taxation and Finance. Thev~ws expressed
in this paper are my own and not those of the NBER or Harvard
University.
IThe cost of equity capital is an important component of the
overall cost of capital if firms consider the repurchase of shares
as an alternative to investment in new capacity (Tobin and
Brainard, 1977) or if the £irms' debt-equity ratios influence
the cost of additional funds (Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski,
1979).
(l00179)2
tax on nominal capital gains, and "institutions" (pension funds,
nonprofit organizations, etc.) that pay no tax on portfolio
income or capital gains. Both types of investors hold equity
shares despite the difference between them in the relative after-
tax yields on stocks and bonds because of their desire to limit
risk through portfolio diversification. l In the simplified
framework of the earlier paper, a rise in the expected rate of
inflation unambiguously depresses the price per share that insti-
tutional investors are willing to pay but may raise the demand
price that household investors are willing to pay. The change
in the equilibrium share price that follows an increase in expec-
ted inflation depends on the portfolio adjustment behavior of
these two types of investors.
Although the earlier analysis conveys the basic idea of how
inflation affects share prices, it must be extended to provide a
more realistic picture of the interaction of inflation and share
prices. The present paper introduces three important aspects to
the model of equilibrium share price behavior. First, the new
analysis recognizes that firms borrow and that the existence of
debt causes inflation to raise the firms' real after-tax earnings
available for equity owners. Second, in contrast to the
lMore formally, both types of investors will generally maxi-
mize expected utility by holding mixed portfolios even though, in
the absence of risk aversion, the difference in the relative
after-tax expected yields on stocks and bonds would cause one
type of investor to hold only one type of asset. See also
Feldstein and Slemrod (1978) and Feldstein and Green (1979).3
assumption in the previous paper that firms distribute all earn~
ings as dividends, the present analysis assumes a realistic ratio
of retained earnings to dividends. The effect of this is to
magnify the impact on share prices of changes in inflation or
other variables. Finally, the present analysis recognizes that
households invest in a much wider range of assets than stocks
and bonds including real estate, consumer durables, noncorporate
businesses, depletable natural resources, and such "store-of-
value" assets as land, gold and antiques; some of these invest-
ment opportunities actually become more attractive when the rate
of inflation increases.l Households may also respond to lower
prospective yields on stocks and bonds by increasing consumption.
The households' broad range of alternatives to investment in
equities implies in general that their opportunity cost of
holding shares does not vary in the same way as that of institu-
tions and, in particular, that it does not vary only with the
real net yield on bonds. This broader set of alternatives is
recognized in the current analysis by explicitly relaxing (but
not completely eliminating) the previous link between the real
net yield on bonds and the required yield on equities.
With these extensions, the current analysis identifies six
ways in which the interaction of inflation and tax rules affects
share prices; (1) Historic cost accounting for depreciation and
lThe interaction of inflation and tax rules affect the net
yield on these assets very differently from the way they effect
either stocks or bonds; see Feldstein (1978b) on land and gold
and Hendershott (1979) on housing.4
~sting methods of inventory accounting raise corporate taxes.
(2) The deduction of nominal interest payments lowers corporate
1 taxes. (3) The net increase in corporate tax payments reduces
dividends and retained earnings, thus lowering tax payments by
shareholders. (4) The nominal increase in the value of the
corporation's capital stock induces a capital gains tax liability
for shareholders. (5) Because households pay tax on nominal
interest income, inflation lowers the real net yield on bonds as
an alternative to share ownership.2 (6) The favorable tax rules
for investment in land, gold, owner-occupied housing, etc. imply
that the real net opportunity cost of shareholding does not fall
as much as the real net yield on bonds and may actually rise.
In considering these interactions of inflation and tax rules, it
is important to distinguish households and non-taxable institu-
tions and to recognize that share prices represent an equilibrium
for these two groups. All of these ideas are developed more
fully in the present paper.
Although it is analytically useful to calculate how infla-
tion affects share prices on the assumption that the pretax return
lIn evaluating the impact of inflation on the total taxes
paid on the capital income of the nonfinancial corporations, it
is important to bear in mind that this reduced corporate tax
liability is almost exactly offset by the increased tax' liability
of the creditors who must pay ta~ on nominal interest receipts (see
Feldstein and Summers, 1979).
2As I emphasized in Feldstein (1978a), this stands in sharp
contrast to the popular nbtion that share prices are depressed
because of high nominal interest rates.5
per unit of· capital is unchanged, a fall in the share price per
dollar of corporate capital would in fact reduce the equilibrium
size of the corporate capital stock and thereby raise the pretax
return until the share price per dollar of capital returned to
its initial equilibrium.l The current paper presents some illus-
trative calculations of the magnitude of the fall in the equili-
brium capital stock that would result under certain simplifying
assumptions.
In the first section of this paper, I analyze an economy in
which shares are owned only by tax exempt institutions. The more
complex effects of inflation on households' demand for equity shares
are examined in section 2. The third section examines the market
equilibrium with both types of investors.
The limitations of the analytic structure should be stressed
at the outset. The model presented here does not represent a
full general equilibrium picture of the effects of inflation on
share prices. Some of the values that are treated as fixed para-
meters should be regarded as endogenous variables in a larger
system. The role and complete consequences of macroeconomic
policy and debt policy remains vague. The pretax yield on capital
in the noncorporate sector is not explicitly treated as an endo-
genous variable. The dynamic specification ignores transitional
lunder certain conditions, the equilibrium share price per
dollar of capital is unity but the presence of taxation may cause
a different value; see Auerbach (1978), Bradford (1979), Feldstein
and Green (1979) and King (1977).6
issues and focuses ori steady state values. I believe that the
model is nevertheless rich enough and realistic enough to demon~
strate the principal chanels through which the interaction of
inflation and tax rules affects share prices.
The present paper is not, however, an attempt to explain
the total fall in the real value of share prices. The behavior
of share prices during the past decade and a half may reflect
not only the interaction of taxes and inflation but also the
cyclical downturn in economic activity and pretax profitability,
the inability of investors to evaluate real corporate earnings
in an inflationary environment, investors' perception of an
increased risk in equity investment, etc.l The goal of the
present paper is more modest: to examine the way in which tax
rules and inflation interact in affecting the share prices of
nonfinancial corporations and to show that the net effect of
inflation is likely to be negative. This conclusion stands in
sharp contrast to papers in which Fama (1979), Hendershott (1979)
and Modigliani and Cohn (1979) have argued that the interaction
of taxes and inflation has raised share prices above the even
lower levels to which they would otherwise have fallen.
lFor explanations along these lines, see Fama (1979),
Hendershott (1979), Malkiel (1978), Modigliani and Cohn (1979),
and Summers (forthcoming).7
1. Institutional Investors
This first section analyzes an economy in which equity
shares are owned only by ~ax exempt institutions like pension
funds and nonprofit organizations. l This provides a simple way
of separating the effect of inflation on corporate taxes from
its effects on the taxes paid by households and shows why it
is important to distinguish the two classes of investors in the
complete analysis. The analysis here shows that an increase
in the expected rate of inflation unambiguously decreases the
attractiveness of equity shares relative to bonds for this impor-
tant group of investors and would therefore lower the share value
per unit of capital.
Consider first an economy in which there is no inflation.
Each share of stock represents the ownership claim to a single
unit of capital (i.e., one dollar's worth of capital valued at
its reproduction cost) and to the net earnings that it produces.
The marginal product of capital (net of depreciation), f', is
subject to a corporate income tax at effective rate Tl ; in the
absence of inflation, this effective rate of tax is less than the
statutory rate (T) because of the combined effect of the invest~
ment tax credit and accelerated depreciation. The corporation
IThese institutions own a significant and growing fraction
of corporate stock, especially of the stock of major pUblicly
traded corporations. Probably because of their exemption from
capital gains taxes, these institutions account for a dispropor-
tionately large share of all transactions in equity shares.8
borrows b dollars per unit of capital and pays interest at rate
r. Since these interest payMents are deducted in calculating
corporate income that is taxed at the statutory rate T, the net'
cost of these borrowed funds is (l-T)br. The net return to equity
investors per unit of capital is therefore (l-Tl)f' - (l-T)br.
To avoid the extra notation of two different corporate tax rates,
I shall define the "equivalent pretax return" p to satisfy (l-T)p
= (l-Pl)f'; i.e., P is the pretax rate of return which, if taxed
at the statutory rate, would yield the same after-tax return as
occurs when the actual pretax return is taxed at the lower "no
inflation" effective tax rate. The net return to equity investors
per unit of capital in the absence of inflation is thus (l-T) (p-br) .
What happens to this net return when the inflation rate rises?
For simplicity, the analysis considers an instantaneous and unan-
ticipated increase to TI which is expected to persist £orever.
Under existing U.S. tax law, inflation raises taxable profits
(for any fixed level of real profits) in two ways. First, the
value of depreciation allowances is based on the original or
"historic" cost of the asset rather than on its current value.
When prices rise, this historic cost method of depreciation causes
the real value of depreciation to fall and the real value of
taxable profits to rise. l Second, the cost of maintaining
2S .f' . pecl lC estlmates of the magnitude of this effect are
discussed below. For a more general discussion, see Feldstein
Green and Sheshinski (1978) and Feldstein (1979). Hong (1977):
Motley (1969) and Van Horne and Glassmir.e (1971) discuss the
implications of historic cost depreciation for share values in
the context of a model with a single investor whose discount
rate is unchanged by inflation.9
inventory levels is understated for firms that use the first-in/
f ' () th d f ' t' 1 1rst out FIFO me 0 0 1nventory accoun 1ng. A linear
approximation that each percentage point of inflation increases
taxable profits per unit of capital by ~ implies that the existing
treatment of depreciation and inventories reduces net profits by
T~ per unit of capital.
When there is a positive rate of inflation, the firms' net
interest paYments «l-T)br) overstate the true cost to the equity
owners of the corporations' debt finance. Against this apparent
interest cost it is n~cessary to offset the reduction in the real
value of the corporations' net monetary liabilities. These net
monetary liabilities per unit of capital are the difference
between the interest-bearing debt (b) and the non-interest-bearing
nominal assets (a) that consist primarily of cash and net accounts
receivable.
Combining the basic net profits per unit of capital, the
extra tax caused by the existing depreciation and inventory rules,
and the real gain on net monetary liabilities yields the real net
return per unit of capital:
(1.1) z = (l-T) (p-br) - T~W + (b-a)w
1A1though firms in principle have the option of avoiding the
extra tax by using the 1ast-in/first-out (LIFO) method of inventory
accounting, a total of $7 billion in extra taxes were paid in
1977 because firms apparently regarded that as less costly in a
larger sense than switching from FIFO to LIFO.10
If q is the share value per unit of equity (i.e., per unit of
capital net of its prorata share of debt), the corporate return
per dollar of equity is e = z/q(l-b).l
If the corporation paid all of its earnings out to share-
holders in the form of dividends, e would also be the net return
to the institutions that own those shares. In fact, corporations
distribute a fraction d as dividends and retain the rest.2 Since
a dollar of retained earnings is worth p, each dollar of corporate
earnings net of the corporate income tax is worth d + (l-d)p
dollars.3 The real net return to institutional investors per
dollar of equity shares is thus
(1. 2) e .
n~
where the sUbscript n indicates that this is a net return and the
subscript i indicates that this is the net return for institutional
investors.
lTO see more easily that this is true, it is useful to think
about the corresponding aggregates. Let K be total capital and
B=bK be the corresponding aggregate debt. The value of the equity
shares are q(K-B) and the total equity earnings are zK. The
corporate equity yield is thus zK/q(K-B) = z/q(l-b).
21 assume that d (like b) does not change with the rate of
inflation. Although this is done primarily to focus attention on
the more direct effects of inflation, neither ratio has changed
significantly during the past 15 years.
3If p is less than 1, institutional investors would obviously
prefer to have all income distributed. Because of their different
tax situation, households will generally prefer some retained
earnings even if p is less than 1. The distribution fraction
observed in the economy reflects the firms' balancing of these
conflicting interests. For an explicit model of the determination
of dividend policy, see Feldstein and Green (1979).11
A simple model of share valuation implies that the price that the
investor would be willing to pay per share would make the real
net earnings per dollar of equity equal to the real net return
on bonds, r-TI. More realistically, investors require a higher
yield on equity investments than they do on the apparently less
risky bonds.
investors is
If the risk differential required by institutional
denotedl O. , their portfolio equilibrium condition
1S
can be written
(1.3) e . = r - TI + O.•
n1 1S
Using equation 1.2 to substitute for e . in equation 1.3 gives a
n1
portfolio equilibrium condition that can be solved explicitly for
the share price:
(1. 4) q = dz
(l-b) (r- TI + O. ) - z (l-d)
1S
The effect of inflation on the equilibrium share price
depends on the change in the real rate of interest (r-TI ) and the
change in the equity earnings net of corporate income tax (z).
Econometric studies indicate that the nominal interest rate rises
point-for-point with sustained changes in the rate of inflation,
lThe subscript s refers to the state of the economy and can
temporarily be i9nored. In general,Q' will be an increasing
function of the number of shares that t~e investor holds in equil-
ibrium.. The current assumption that all shares are held by
institutional investors implies that 0is does not depend on the
rate of inflation if we ignore any effect of changes in the con-
stant inflation rate on the perceived riskiness of stocks.12
dr/d'IT =1.1 It is important to emphasize that this "FisherianII feature
of the economy is an empirical regularity and not a theoretical
necessity. As Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978) emphasize,
the response of the nominal interest rate to inflation in an
economy without government bonds depends on tax rates, deprecia-
tion rules and investor behavior. 2 The actual behavior of the
interest rate depends also on government debt policy3 and on the
supply of debt by noncorporate borrowers. The remainder of the
paper assumes that dr/d'IT = I, i.e., that the real interest rate
remains constant.
With a constant real rate of interest, equation 1.5 shows
that inflation lowers the equilibrium share price if dz/d'IT < 0
IThe conclusion that inflation raises the nominal interest
rate while leaving the real rate unchanged has been supported by
a large number of studies. See Fisher (1930), Yohe and Karnovsky
(1969), Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) and, more recently, Fama
(1975) and Feldstein and Summers (1978).
2calculations by Feldstein and Summers (1978) show that, with
existing tax rules, the interest rate would rise by slightly more
than the rise in the rate of inflation if the difference in the
real net yields on stocks and bonds for a typical individual
investor is to be maintained. They found empirically that the
interest rate movement did not maintain this real net yield
difference but satisfied dr/d'IT = 1.
3Feldstein (1978c) presents an explicit model of equilibrium
growth that shows how different government debt policies can
modify the real rate of interest in a way that is independent of
the rate of inflation.13
and raises the equilibrium share price if dz/d1T > O. From equation
1.1,
(1. 5) ~~ = -(l-T)b - T~ + b - a
= T(b... ~) ... a
Recent values of these parameters imply that dz/d1T is nega-
tive and therefore that inflation would reduce the short-run
equilibrium share price in an economy in which only tax exempt
institutions own shares. In 1977, nonfinancial corporations
had a total capital stock of $1,684 billion and owed net interest-
bearing liabilities of $595 billion,l implying that b = 0.353.
The net non-int.erest-bearing assets (consisting of cash and net
trade credits) have a value of $133.9 billion, implying that a = 0.079.
Since the corporate tax rate in 1977 was T = 0.48, these figures
imply that dz/d1T = 0.090 - T~.
While it is difficult to calculate ~ as precisely as T, b
and z, it is clear that T~ exceeds 0.09 and therefore that dz/d1T < O.
Recall that ~1T is the overstatement of taxable profits per dollar
of capital caused by inflation at rate 1T. Feldstein and Summers
(1979) estimate that in 1977 inflation caused an overstatement
of taxable profits, of $54.3 billion of which $39.7 billion was
due to low depreciation and $14.6 was due to artificial inventory
lThe capital stock, valued at replacement cost in 1977
dollars, is estimated by the Department of Commerce. The net
liabilities are based on information in the Flow of Funds tables.
See Feldstein and Summers (1979) for more details on both numbers.14
profits. Thus in 1977 ~rr ~ 54.3/1684 ~ 0.032. The implied
value of ~ depends on the rate of inflation that was responsible
for these additional taxable profits. For the inventory component
of the overstated profits, the relevant inflation rate is the one
for the concurrent year; for the depreciation component, the
relevant inflation rate is a weighted average of the inflation
rates since the oldest remaining capital was acquired but with
greater weight given to inflation in more recent years. The
consumer price index rose 6.8 percent in 1977, an average of 7.2
percent in the preceeding five years, and 4.5 percent and 1.9
percent in the two previous five year periods.1 An inflation rate
of 7.0 percent is therefore a reasonable upper bound for the
relevant rate and 5.0 percent is a reasonable lower bound. A
value ofrr ~ 0.06 implies that ~ ~ 0.53 and therefore that
T~ ~ 0.256; even at the upper bound of rr = 0.07, ~ = 0.46 and
T~ = 0.22. Both of these values are clearly above the critical
value of 0.09 required for dz/drr > O. In the analysis that follows,
I shall assume ~ = 0.53, a value that is also implied by an alter-
native calculation presented in the appendix to this paper.2
Two more parameter values are required to calculate expli-
citly the effect of inflation on the real rate of return to equity
lThe index of producer prices for finished goods rOse 6.6
percent in 1977 and an average of 5.9 percent for the previous
decade, essentially the same as the CPl.
2The alternative calculation is based on selecting a hypo-
thetical investment 'and seeing how inflation changes the after-tax
internal rate of return with existing tax laws.15
capital: the equivalent pretax rate of return (p) and the real
interest rate (r - TI). For the period from 1948 through 1976,
the cyclically-adjusted rate of return on capital in the nonfin-
ancial sector averaged 11.2 percent (Feldstein and Summers, 1977);
using this value implies fl = 0.112. In the absence of inflation,
the tax rules as of 1977 imply an effective corporate tax rate of
1 Tl = 0.38. Since p is defined by (l-T)p = (l-Tl)fl , P = 0.134.
The real interest rate is estimated most easily for a period
with low and quite stable inflation. Between 1960 and 1964, the
annual rates of increase of the consumer price index varied
between 1.0 percent and 1.6 percent with a mean of 1.24 percent.
The interest rate on Baa bonds varied between an annual average
of 5.19 percent in 1960 and 4.83 percent in 1964 with an overall
average of 5.00 percent. These figures imply a real interest
rate of 3.75 percent for Baa bonds. 2
lThis figure is derived in the following way. The total
1977 tax on nonfinancial corporations (T) is equal to the tax on
real capital income (T flK) plus the excess tax caused by infla-
tion (T~TIK) minus the tax reduction associated with the deduction
of interest expenses (TrbK). According to the national income
accounts, the 1977 tax liability of nonfinancial corporations was
$59.0 billion, the net interest payments were rbK = $33.7 billion,
and profits (with -the eapital-consumption and inventory valuation
adjustments) were flK -·rbK = $113.9 billion. Comgining these
with the Feldstein and Summers (1979) estimate of the excess tax
due to inflation (T~TIK = $19,1 billion) and the statutory tax
rate of T = 0.48 implies that the effective corporate rate in the
absence of inflation would be Tl = 0.38.
2Since the Baa rate fell monotonically during the early 1960's
the implied real interest rate might be as low as 3.5 percent. '
(The Baa rate of 8.97 percent in 1977 implies an anticipated
inflation rate of approximately 6.25 percent. Since then the
r~se in interest rates implies an increase in anticipated infla-
t1.on to between 7.50 and 7.75 percent. These calculations of
course assume the continuous maintenance of a constant real rate of
interest.)16
Combining these parameter estimates implies that the real
rate of return to equity per dollar of capital in the absence of
inflation would be (from equation 1.1);
(1.6) z = (1 - T) (p - br)
= .52 (.134 - .353 (.0375»
= .0628
With a six percent rate of inflation, z falls to:
(1.7) z = (1 - T ) (p - br) - Tj.lTI + (b - n) TI
= .52(.134 - .353(.0975» - .48(.53) (.06)
+ (.353 - .079).06
= .0530
The rate of return at the level of the corporation thus falls by
approximately one percentage point or one-sixth of its pre-infla-
tion value.
The share price equation (1.5) contains two parameters that
have not yet been evaluated: the dividend pay-out rate (d) and
the risk differential (Ois)' In 1977, the corporations paid divi.,..
dends equal to 45.3 percent of their real after tax profits; this
payout ratio has varied cyclically but averaged 45.4 percent
during the preceeding 15 year period. I shall assume d = 0.45 in
all of the calculations. The risk differential (Qis) can be calcu-
lated directly from the share price equation 1.4 by imposing the
long-run equilibrium condition that q = 1. Thus 1.4 implies(1.8) OJ.' S = _z_ - (r-7r) I-b




Thus stocks yield 9.71 percent in this no-inflation equilibrium
or 5.96 percent more than the yield on bonds.
It is now possible to calculate the effect of inflation on
the short-run equilibrium share price for this economy in which
all shares are owned by institutional investors. For a six percent
inflation, equation 1.5 implies that
(1.9) q = zd
(I-b) (r-7r + O. ) - z (I-d)
J.s
.45(.0530) =
(.647) (.0375 + .0596) - .0530(.55)
= .708
The short-run equilibrium share price falls to 71 percent of its
no-inflation value. Note that the proportional fall in q is
nearly twice as great as the proportional fall in z, a magnifica-
tion that results from recognizing the effect of retained earnings.
In considering this fall in the short-run equilibrium share
price, it is important to bear in mind that it treats the risk
differential (ois) as fixed. Although inflation may in fact
alter the perceived riskiness of investments in stocks and bonds,
this is ignored here in order to focus on the interaction of18
inflation anq ta~ rules. l
It is alsq important to emphasize that the new share price
in equation 1.10 is calculated on the assumption that the pretax
rate of return (p) remains unchanged and therefore that the capital
stock qf the corporate sector is unchanged. The lower share
price would reduce investment in the corporate sector and this
would cause the pretax rate of return p to rise. The reduced
rate of investment would continue until the share price returned
to its original long-run equilibrium value of q = 1. Ignoring
this eventual return to q = 1 causes equation 1.9 to overstate
the actual short-run fall in the share price.
To specify the capital adjustment process correctly requires
at least a two-sector model of the economy in which capital and
labor can both move from the nonfinancial corporate sector (and
from other activities where inflation raises the effective tax
rate) to activities like owner-occupied housing that are not
taxed more heavily when the inflation rate rises. Consider
instead a simpler calculation of the required reduction in the
corporate capital stock if relative prices remain unchanged and
the reduction in capital is the only way in which the pretax rate
IThe risk differential would also change with the rate of
inflation because of the induced shift in share ownership,
Discussion of this will be postponed until the dema.nd for shares
by household inyestorshas been considered.., . d 1 of return 1S 1ncrease •
19
With this simplification, it is easy to
calculate the long-run reduction in the capital stock that is
induced by a six percent inflation. It follows from the share
price equation (1.4 or 1.9) that returning to the original share
value of q = 1 is equivalent to raising z to the value that
prevailed in the absence of inflation or, from equation 1.6,
z = 0.0628.
Equation 1.1 can be used to calculate the value p* that is
required to make z = 0.0628 with TI = 0.06:
(1.10) .0628 = (l-T) (p*-br) - Tl..lTI + (b-a) TI
= .52(p*-.353(.0975» - .48(.53) (.06)
+ (.353-.079) (.06)
= .52p* + .0191
or p* = .1575. Thus the value of p must rise from 0.134 to 0.1575
to reestablish the long-run equilibrium. The corresponding change
in the capital stock depends on the form and parameters of the
production function. A Cobb-Douglas technology with a capital
elasticity of 0.2 implies an 18 percent reduction in the equilibria
capital stock.
In summary, in an economy with our existing tax rules but in
which all shares were owned by institutions that paid no "personal"
IThis would be the appropriate calculation if the only alter~
native to investment in corporate capital were government debt.
More generally, it is necessary to recognize the changes in the
relative product prices and in the allocation of labor among the
sectors of the economy.20
tax on income or capital gains, a six percent inflation would
induce a fall in the short-run equilibrium share price of nearly
30 percent and a fall in the long-run capital intensity of between
15 and 20 percent. The analysis for an economy with household
as well as institutional investors is more complex and the
results are more ambiguous. Before considering the behavior of
this complete market equilibrium, it is useful to begin by analy-
zing the share valuation equation for households.21
2. Household Investors
(2.1) z = (1-T) (p-br) - T].l1T + (b-a) 'IT
and the corporate return per dollar of equity is again e = z/q(l-b).
A fraction d of this return is paid out as dividends and subject
to individual income tax at rate m. The fraction that is retained
adds (l-d)q to the value of the firm. This real increase in the22
firm's value is eventually subject to a capital gains tax when
the stock is sold. The postponed tax liability can be expressed
instead as an equivalent present-value tax rate c on accruing
capital gains; since the actual liability is postponed and the
gain taxed at less than the rate on ordinary income, c < m.
Inflation reduces these net earnings even further by imposing
an additional tax on nominal capital gains. More specifically,
even though the real share price remains constant at the new real
equilibrium value q, inflation causes the nominpl share price to
rise at 100 rr percent a year. The real value of this nominal
gain at any time is thus rrq per share or rrq(l-b) per unit of
. 1 1 caplta . This entails no real gain but does induce an ultimate
capital gains tax liability with an equivalent accrual amount of
crrq(l-b) per unit of capital.
The real net return to household investors per dollar of
equity value is thus:
(2.2) = z[d(l-m) + (I-d) (l-c)q] - crrq(l-b)
(l-b)q
where the subscript h indicates that this is a net yield to
households.
For institutional investors, portfolio equilibrium was char-
acterized by equating this net equity yield to the sum of the real
ITO see why this is rrq(l-b) note that the total real capital
stock K minus the value of the debt (bK) is the capital share of
the equity owners and is valued at m per unit of net capital.
Thus the total equity value is E = q(l-b)K. In addition to any
retained e~rnings, the nominal value of equity rises at the rate
TIE = rrq(l-b)K. The nominal gain per unit of capital is thus
TIq(l-b).23
net yeild on bonds and a risk differential that would in general
vary with the number of shares that those investors own.. For
household investors, I shall adopt a similar equilibrium condi~
tion that the required net equity yield may be written as the
sum of two components: a real net yield on alternative assets
(ns ) and a risk differential that depends on the number of shares
I that households own:
(2.3)
The subscript s on n indicates that the real net yield on alter- s
native assets varies with the state of the economy, i.e.; with
the rate of inflation.
For ordinary bonds, the real net yield is (l-m)r - TIi the
assumption that dr/dTI = I implies that the real net yield on such
bonds falls by the fraction m of any increase in the inflation
rate. Investments in other assets are treated much more favorably
in an inflationary economy. Owner-occupied housing is not affec-
ted by depreciation rules, the nominal capital gains are largely
untaxed, and the deductibility of nominal mortgage interest pay-
ments reduces the real net cost of mortgage finance. Investments
in nondepreciable property (land, timber, depletable resources,
IThe form of the dependence of ok on the number of shares
owned by households will be made expl1~it below. The value of
Q will also depend on the risk per share, This additive separ-
aBIlity assumption is obviously a simplification that would only
be consistent with expected utility maximization on very stringent
assumptions.24
gold, etc.) are also not affected by the historic cost deprecia~
tion rules. Although these investments entail eventual capital
gains tax liabilities on their nominal appreciation, this rela-
tively small tax is often more than offset by the tax deducti-
bility of interest payments on the debt associated with these
investments. Although investments in depreciable real estate
are disadvantaged by the historic cost depreciation rule, the
relatively high ratio of debt to total capital for such investments
implies that even the reduction in real depreciation is often
more than offset by the deductibility of nominal interest. l On
balance, therefore, inflation may lower, raise or leave unchanged
the yield on alternative investments to which household investors
compare the yield on equity.2 The risk premium that a household
requires to hold an additional share of equity should be an
increasing function of the amount of risk that the household is
already bearing. This relation (and the similar one for institu-
tionaI investors) will be discussed explicitly in section 3.
Combining equations 2.2 and 2.3 gives an explicit equation
for the price per share that household investors would be willing
to pay:
~he ratio of debt to total cap~tal is usually much greater
for commercial real estate investments than it is for nontinancial
corporat~ons in general.
. 2~he.c~ange ~n ns will differ among households according to
t~e~: ~nd7vldual ~~come tax brackets. Moreover, the new equi-
17br~um wlll alsq lnvolve some capitalization of yield differen-
tlals. Because of differences in tax rates among households
this capitalization cannot be complete for all households. '(2.5) q =
25
(l-m) zd
(I-b) (n +Qh ) + (I-b) CTI - (I-d) (I-c) z s s
The analysis in section I showed that the net effect of higher
inflation on depreciation, inventories and the deductibility of
corporate interest expenses reduces the corporation's net of
tax income, z. Equation 2.5 shows that this lower value of z
reduces the share price. The taxation of the households' nominal
capital gains, reflected in the term (l-b)cTI in the denominator
of equation 2.5, further depresses the share price. Thus if the
household's required yield on equities (ns + 0hs) uses or remains
unchanged, the interaction of inflation and tax rules unambigu-
ously reduces the share price that households are willing to pay.
Since section I showed that the institution's demand price would
unambiguously decline, a constant or higher value of ns + 0hs
means that a higher rate of inflation would unambiguously reduce
the equilibrium share price.
A significant fall in the household's required yield on equi-
ties is required to prevent a decline in their demand price for
shares. Even if such a decline in ns + Qhs does prevent a
decline in the household's demand price, the unambiguous reduc-
tion in institutions' demand for shares might cause a fall in the
market equilibrium price of shares.
The magnitude of the decline in n + 0h that would maintain s . s
the household's demand for equities is easily calculated with the
help of equation 2.5. It is necessary first to evaluate the two
tax rates paid by household investors, m and c. For the average26
tax rate on dividends (m), I shall use the weighted average of
shareholder marginal tax rates, weighting by the amount of divi-
dends received; Feldstein and Summers (1979) report the value
m = 0.39.1 It is more'difficult to estimate the relevant rate
of capital gains tax, c. Long-term capital gains are taxed at
about half of the rate on dividends2 when the gain is realized.
However, since gains are taxed only when they are realized, the
effective rate is reduced by the postponement of realization. In
addition, capital gains that have accrued on assets that are
passed on at the death of their owner completely avoid tax on the
previously accrued gain because the new owner is permitted to
"step up" his basis to the value at the time of receipt for the
purpose of calculating future capital gains liabilities. A conser-
vatively low value of c = 0.05 will be used.
with these values of m and c and the other parameter values
that were obtained in section 1, it is now possible to use equa-
tion 2.5 to derive the value of n + 0h that is consistent with s s
lA one percent increase in the dividend receipts of each
taxpayer would increase the income tax liability by 39 percent
of the additional dividends. This calculation is done with the
NBER T~XSIM model based on 1976 tax rates.
2until 1978, half of long-term gains were excludable in
calculating taxable income; since then, the exclusion has increased
to 60 percent. The total tax rate on capital gains also depends
on the availability of the alternative tax method (until 1978),
the treatment o£ the excluded portion of gains as a tax preference,
and the reduction in the amount of earned income eligible for the
maximim tax provision (until 1978).27
zero inflation and an initial share price of qo = 1. More speci-
fically, with Zo = 0.0628, d = 0.45 and b = 0.353, equation 2.5
implies that ns + 0hs = 0.0774.
A rise in the inflation rate rises to TI = 0.06 would reduce
1
z from Zo = 0.0628 to zl = 0.0530 and would add (l-b)cTI = 0.00194
to the denominator to reflect the taxation of nominal capital
gains. If the required rate of return on equities remains
unchanged at n + 0h = .0774, the demand price implied by equa- s s
tion 2.5 drops from qo = 1 to ql = 0.598, a more substantial
reduction than the decline in the institutional investors'
demand price to 0.708.
To prevent this decline in the household's demand price, the
required rate of return would have to drop from 0.0774 to 0.0623
or less. 2 Only if such a decline in ns + 0hs occurred could the
households' demand for equities increase. The possibility of
such a decline and the corresponding change in the equilibrium
share price when households and institutions are considered
together is one of the cases considered in the next section.
lSee page 16 for the calculation that TI = 0~06 implies
zl = 0.0570.
2The value of 0.0623 is obtained from equation 2.5 by setting
q = 1, z = .0530 and (l-b)cTI = 0.00194 and then solving for
n + 0h . s s28
3. Market Equilibrium
The separate analyses of institutional and household inves-
tors have shown how inflation affects these two components of the
total demand for shares. An increase in the rate of inflation
unambiguously reduces the institutional investors' demand because
the real net yield on equities falls while the corresponding
yield on the alternative investment in bonds does not. For house-
hold investors, the demand for equities declines unless the real
net yield on the portfolio of alternative financial and real
investments falls enough to offset the lower return on equities
and the extra tax on nominal capital gains. If the equity demands
of both households and institutions decline, the market price of
shares must also decline in the short-run and the capital stock
of the nonfinancial corporate sector must decline in-the long-run.
More generally, a higher rate of inflation might reduce the
real net yield on the alternative assets in which households
invest by enough to increase their demand for equity shares. The
change in the market equilibrium price then depends on the way in
which the risk differentials of institutions and households (6.
1S
and 0hs1 respond to changes in the distribution of share ownership.
The present section therefore begins by presenting an explicit
model of the determination of o· and 0h •
1S S
The risk premium that an institution requires to hold an
additional share of equity should be an increasing function of
the amount of risk that the household is already bearing. More
explicitly, I shall assume that 0is is proportional to the29
standard deviation of the return on the equity portion of the
existing portfolio.l The source of th~s uncerta~nty is the varia-
bility of the pretax return on capital p;2 the var~ance of p will
2
be written 0p Equations 1.1 and 1.2 imply that the variance
[ J
2 2 2 2 2 per dollar of equity investment is d + (I-d) q (1... T) °p / (I-b) q .
If institutions own S. shares when the economy is in state s,
1S
the dollar value of their equity investment is S. q where q is
1S S s
the price prevailing in state s. The standard deviation of the
return on the equity portion of the institutions' portfolio is the
product of the dollar value of the equity investment: Sis[d + (l-d)qs]
(rT)0p (1-b). If the risk differential between the yields on bonds
and stocks is proportion,al to this standard deviation, O. can be
1S
written:
(3.1) o. = o. S. fd + (l-d)q ] (l-T) (I-b)-1o
1S 1 1S ~ S P
where O. is a risk-aversion constant for institutions.
1
Note that all of the variables that determine 0is are measur-
able except 0i and 0p and that only their product matters. Recall
that equation 1.8 showed that in general O. = z/(l-b) - (r-n)
1S
and that with no inflation O. = 0.0596. In 1967, before the
1S
lThis would be the standard deviation of the entire portfolio
return if bonds were completely riskless.
2The current analysis ignores any direct effect of increased
inflation on perceived risk in order to focus analytic attention on
the interaction of taxes and the steady-state rate of inflation.30
inflation rate began to accelerate, institutions held approximately
$100 billion of corporate equities.l I shall take the share price
in 1967 to be q = 1. o Measuring the total equity value in billions




-3 = O.741~lO •
The risk sensitivity parameter for households (ohO'P) can
be obtained in essentially the same way. The assumption that the
risk premium that a household requires to hold additional shares of
equity is proportional to the standard deviation of the return on
the equity portion of the existing portfolio2 implies that
(3.2)
0h is the risk aversion constant for households. The analysis in
section 2 showed that, in the absence of inflation, an equilibrium
share price of qo = 1 implies no + 0ho = 0.0774. For any value of
no' 0ho is calculable and equation 3.2 can be used to derive 0hO's.
This specification implies that'n is the minimum yield on o
equities that is required to induce households to own any equities
at all; it is equal to the real net yield to households on the
IThe flow of funds accounts for 1967 report that pensions and
insurance companies owned $79 billion of corporate equities at
market value. Of the $720 bi,llion of equities owned by "households(
personal trusts and nonprofit organizations," approximately $20
billion are attributable to nonprofit organizations.
2This would be most appropriate if the other assets in the
households' portfolio could be treated as riskless but, in any case,
the simple additive separability and proportionality specification
of the required equity yield must be regarded as a useful approxi-
mation rather than a general result.31
portfolio of alternative assets (in the absence of inflation)
plus the required risk differential when the households currently
= 0.03,
0,0374 and
-3 2.230n )10 ;
o More generally chap = (0.173 -
chap = 0.615 . 10-4 while with no 0.05,
chap
thus with no =
own no equities. For example, no = 0.04 implies 0ho =
= 0.834 . 10-4 . 1
chap = 0.106 . 10-3 . The risk sensitivity parameter of households
is thus approximately one-tenth of the corresponding parameter
for institutions, a difference that primarily reflects the much
larger total wealth of households.
The equilibrium share price and distribution of share owner-
ship at any inflation rate must satisfy three conditions: the
institutional portfolio balance condition, the household portfolio
balance condition, and the requirement that the total demand for
shares by households and institutions equals the existing supply.
In the short run, with the stock of capital fixed, this provides
three equations that simultaneously determine q , Sh and S.. In s .s 1S
the long-run, the share price must equal one and the three equations
determine the equilibrium size of the corporate capital stock and
its distribution between households and institutions.
Consider first the short-run equilibrium with a fixed stock
of capital and a fixed number of shares S. The institutional port-
folio balance condition can be written (from 1.4);
lThis is based on household ownership of $700 billion of equi-








(I-b) (r-7T+o.. ) - z (I-d)
1S
z = (l-T) (p-br) - 'T].l7T + (b-a)7T
Note that the dependence of O. on S. implies that 3.3 can be
1S 1S
thought of as the institutions' inverse demand function for shares;
ceterus paribus a higher price is associated ~ith a smaller number
of shares. The corresponding household portfolio balance condition





(I-b) (ns+ohs) + (I-b) C7T - z (l-d) (I-d)
(3.7) 0hs = (0.173 - 2.230no ) (10-3)ShS~(1-m) + (I-d) (l-c)qJ
(l-'T) (l_b)-l .
Finally, the demand for shares must equal the fixed supply:
(3.8)
These six equations determine the equilibrium share price q, the
share ownership of households and institutions (Sis and ~s) and the
incidental parameters z, 0. and 0h .
1S s33
The numerical parameter values in equation 3.5 and 3.7 were
selected to make the equations consistent with the initial equili-
brium of TI = 0 and q = 1 with share ownership Sio = 100 and ShO = 700.
The response of q to changes in TI depends on the initial level of
no and on the way in which it is changed by inflation as well as on
the other parameter values that have been discussed at earlier
points in the paper. This is seen more clearly when equations 3.3
through 3.8 are reduced to a set of three equations evaluated at
TI = 0.06. A subscript 1 will be used to distinguish the equilibrium
values at TI = 0.06 from the equilibrium value with no inflation
that are subscripted with a zero. For convenience, I will define
-3
Sil = 10 Sil and Shi =
. 1
. then be reduced to:
-3
10 Shl' Equations 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 can
(3.9)





(.0247 - .3l83no )Shlql + (.04700 - .6059no)Shlq l
- (.02575 -.647nl )ql - 0.01455 = 0
S· + S = 800 hI il
lThis uses the previous calculation that z = 0.053 at TI = .06.34
Consider first the implications of an initial alternative
yield of n = 0.04 that does not change at all when the inflation o
rate rises to 6 percent (nl = 0.04). Solving equations 3.9 through
3.11 indicates that the price falls from qo = 1 to ql = 0.74.
Institutions increase their share ownership from Sis = 100 billion
shares (at qo = 1) to Sil = 122 billion shares (at ql = 0.74); the
fall in the price per share implies that the total value of their
equity holdings fall from $100 billion to $90 billion. Households
reduce their share ownership from Sho = 700 billion shares to Shl
= 678 billion shares and thus reduce the value of the equity
holdings from $700 billion to $502 billion. The institutional
ownership increases from 12.5 percent of total equities to 15.3
1 percent.
These results are not sensitive to changes in the initial
level of the alternative yield. The assumption that no = 0.03
(instead of no = 0.04) and that this does not change when the
inflation rate rises to 6 percent implies that inflation reduces
the price to Pl = 0.76. Institutional holding rises to 118 billion
shares and therefore to the same $90 billion as with no = 0.04.
lBetween 1967 and 1977, corporate equities declined from
approximately 40 percent of household assets to approximately 25
percent. Equities remained at 55 percent of private pension assets
and rose from 9 percent of the assets of state and local government
employee retirement funds to 23 percent. Among insurance companies,
equities remained at 11 percent of total assets. Thus institutions
as a whole increased the fraction of their assets devoted to equi-
ties. Since the total assets of these institutions also rose some
faster than the total assets of households, the fraction of equities
held by households declined from about 88 percent to about 78
percent.in a simplified model, in the capital stock.
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The assumed change in the yield on alternative assets caused
by inflation does however have a substantial impact. If n falls
from n~ = 0.04 to nl = 0.03, the equilibrium price only falls from
qo = 1 to ql = 0,89. This fall in nl implies that households would
actually increase their shareholding to 704 billion shares while
institutions reduced their shareholding. The fall in nl required
to keep the equilibrium share price unchanged implies an even more
implausible decrease in shareholding by institutions; if n falls
from no = 0.04 to nl = 0.024, the equilibrium price remains unchanged
at q = 1 but institutions reduce their shareholds from $100 billion
to $81 billion. Finally, it is interesting to note that a £all in
nl from 0.04 to 0.027 would be enough to increase the price that
households would be willing to pay in isolation2 but leads to a
fall in the market equilibrium price (ql = 0.94) and a substantial
increase in the number of shares held by households (to 722 billion
shares) .
The equilibrium conditions of equations 3.3 through 3.8 can
now be used to calculate the change in the pretax rate of return3
that is required for long-run equilibrium. Instead of regarding
lRelative to the actual increase during the period of infla-
tion described in the previous footnote,
2See above, page 2~ where it is noted that any fall greater
than 0.015 would raise household demand for shares.
3And therefore,36
p as exogenous (in equation 3.4 ) and q as endogenous, the analysis
will now set q = 1 and solve for the value of p that is consistent
with TI = 0.06. The solution indicates that with no = nl = 0.04,
p rise from 0.134 to 0.157. The 17 percent rise in the required
marginal product of capital implies a significant fall in the
capital stock of nonfinancial corporations.l Consider again the
simplifying assumptions of section 1 that relative prices remain
unchanged and that the fall in the corporate sector capital stock
is the only way to raise the pretax rate of return. A Cobb-Douglas
technology with a capital elasticity of 0.2 implies that raising
p from 0.134 to 0.157 requires an 18 percent fall in the capital
stock. If inflation lowers the yield on alternative assets so that
nl = 0.03, the required rate of return rises to p = 0.143 and the
Cobb-Douglas technology implies an 8 percent fall in the capital
stock. Although the simplifying assumptions mean that these figures
are only rough approximations, they do indicate the significant
effect that the interaction of inflation and existing tax rules may
have on the incentive to invest.
IMore generally, the capital is also reduced in other activi-
ties that are more heavily taxed because of inflation.37
4. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has shown that, because of existing
tax rules, a permanent increase in the expected rate of inflation
will depress the price of equity shares and will reduce the size of
the equilibrium capital stock in the affected industries. This
conclusion is based on calculations that use likely values of the
tax and financial variables and that explicitly recognize the impor-
tant roles of debt finance and retained earnings.
A number of other recent studies that have reached the opposite
conclusion (that the interaction of taxes and inflation does not
depress share prices) are based on a faulty or incomplete descrip-
tion of the tax effects. For example, Fama (1979) concludes that
taxes could not be responsible for the fall in real share values
during the 1970's because the ratio of corporate taxes to gross
corporate income (before subtracting depreciation and real interest
payments) has fallen since the 1960's. I do not understand the
purpose of this comparison since the denominator does not refer to
equity income and the numerator does not includeall of the taxes
paid by equity investors. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) refer to the
fact that inflation reduces the real value of depreciation but38
1 underestimate the magnitude of this effect by more than 60 percent.
They ~lso ignore the extra tax on the portfolio investors and the
way in which the interaction of inflation and taxes alters the real
net yields available on alternative assets. Hendershott's (1979)
extension and critique of Feldstein (1978) avoids many of the prob-
lems of other studies but his empirical results are difficult to
interpret because he inadve~tently uses the pre~jnflation nominal
yield on debt to describe portfolio bale-nce. None of the studies
with which I am familiar recognize the ~mportance of distinguishing
among investors in different tax situations, either generally or
the particular distinction between households and tax-free institu-
tions that has been emphasized in the cur~ent paper.
There are of courSf, 2, number of vlays in vJhich the present
s-etldy could be extended and strenqthened. Like any model of a
single market, the results could be improved by imbedding the
current model in a mor~ complete general Gquilibri~m system. In
lModigli,ani and Cohn est.imate the effe::::t of inflation on
allmvable depreciation by the capital consumption adjustment CCCA)
estimated by the Department of Commerce. The CCA actually J:'eflects
two countervailing differences b~tween real st~aiqht~line depre-
ciation and the depreciation allowed for tax purposes: acceleration
makffitax-deductible depreciation exceed straight~line depreciation
while inflation reduces the value of tax-deductible depreciation.
In 1977, for example, the "acceleration component!' raised tax deduc-
tible depreciation by $25.0 billion while the ,.inflation component"
reduced tax depreciation by $39.7 billion. The $14.7 billion dif-
ference between 'these two is the net CCA figure of the type used
by Modigliani and Cohn; it is only 37 percent of the true reduction
in depreciation caused by inflation. (Although the "acceleration
component" grew during the 1970's, this was almost entirely due to
changes in tax laws in the 1960's"and to the growth of investment.
The favorable tax rules and the likely future would therefore have
been anticipated in the late 1960's and reflected in share prices at
that time. Only the subsequent unanticipated inflation and the
associated loss of real depreciation would affect subsequent share
price moments.)39
this way, the effect of reductions in the stock of nonfiancial
corporate capital on the yields in other markets could be explicitly
evaluated. An explicit model of the adjustment of the capital stock
would permit a more accurate evaluation of the initial change in
price. A better empirical specification of the yields on the alter-
native assets in the household's portfolio would also be desirable.
Finally, a more general specification of the other factors that influ-
ence the movement of share prices is a necessary prerequisite to
direct empirical measurement of the extent to which the poor perfor-
mance of the stock market during the 1970's is due to the interac-
tion of inflation and existing tax rules. l40
Appendix
Historic Cost Depreciati~_~ndEffective T,~Ra~es
The text of this paper introduced the parameter W to measure
the extent to which inflation raises taxable corporate income by
reducing the real value of depreciation allowances and inventory
costs. Although the component of W caused by existing inventory
methops could be calculated directly, the more important deprecia-
tion component required the rather arbitrary selection of "the"
inflation rate responsible for the 1977 understatement of real
depreciation. The rate of TI = .06 was selected to reflect exper-
ience during the life of the then existing capital stock. The
implied value of the depreciation component of W is 0.19. Although
the results are not very sensitive to plausible variations in their
inflation rate, it seems desirable to estimate this parameter by an
alternative method.
The current appendix uses the "hypothetical project" technique
that I employed with Lawrence Summers in an earlier study (Feldstein
and Surruners, 1978). This method is completely free of the recent
historic experience. It nevertheless produces a value of the depre-
ciation parameter (say, 1.1 1' that is extremely close to the estimate
based on the national account data. The similarity of the two
results provides substantial support for this value.
Consider' a .,standard investment" that in the absence of taxes41
1 has an internal rate of return of 12 percent. Let the nominal rate
of return that the firm can afford to pay for funds invested in this
project. In the qbsence of tax this would be 12 percent; with pure
debt finance and economic depreciation, the firm could pay this
nominal return regardless of the corporate income tax. But less
than economic depreciation would reduce this maximum potential rate
2 of return.
The Feldstein-Summers study considered how a 6 percent infla-
tion would change the maximum potential interest rate that a firm
could pay.on the standard project if the project was financed with
one-third debt and two-thirds equity and if the real net equity
yield to typical individual investors had to exceed their real net
yield on debt by 6 percent. The analysis showed that a maximum
potential nominal interest rate of 3.3 percent with no inflation
would rise to 11.3 percent with a 6 percent inflation.3 The assump-
tion of one-third debt finance and a 6 percent yield differential
implies that a 6 percent inflation rate would lower the total
~------
IThe "standard investment" is actually a mix of equipment and
structures, each with its own exponential output decay structure.
See Feldstein and Summers, 1978, page 67.
2For a more complete description, see Feldstein and Summers
(1978) pp. 57-73.
3These calculations assumed, in the notation of the present
paper, T = 0.5, ~ = 0.4, d = 0.5 and c = 0.1.42
maximum potential real yield on capital by 1,2 percentage points:
l
T~lTI = 0.012 or, with the value of T = 0.5 used in that calculation,
~l = 0.40. This estimate is almost identical to the value inferred
from the national account data and embodied in the total value
(including inventory effects as well) of ~ = 0.53 that is used in
the text.
lThis value of 0.012 can be derived as follows with the nota~
tion of the present paper. The assumption of a 6 percent yield
differential implies (l-m) i - TI + . 06 = [d (l-m) + (i-d) (l-c)] (2/(i-b) )
- CTI. The earlier study found i = 0.033 when TI = a and i = 0.113
when TI = 0.06. These imply 2 = .0709 when TI = a and 2 = ,0656 when
TI = 0.06. In the present paper, T~ TI is the change in 2 induced by
the effect of historic cost depreciation; using this would imply
~ = 0.363. But the Feldstein-Summers calculation assumes a rise in
t~e real interest rate and ther.ef.ore an understateme.nt of ~l' The
total nominal return that the firm pays for ~unds is N ~ bC.l-T)i
+ 2 + (l-b)TI. In the absence of inflation, N = 0.0764 while at
TI = .06, N =0.1244. The real return on c~pital falls from 0.0764
to 0.0694, a fall of 0.012.43
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